Abstract-This paper is concerned with a subspace guarding game, which is a reach-avoid game, in high-dimensional space which consists of a play subspace and a target subspace divided by a hyperplane. In this differential game, two faster defenders cooperate to protect the target subspace by capturing an attacker which strives to enter into the target subspace from the play subspace without being captured. A complete, closedform solution is provided from the perspectives of kind and degree. Contributions of the work include the use of the attack subspace (AS) method to construct the barrier, by which the game winner can be perfectly predicted before the game starts. In addition to this inclusion, with the priori information about the game result, two critical payoff functions are designed for two winning subspaces obtained from the barrier. Then, the optimal strategy for each player is reformulated as a saddle-point equilibrium, and the expression of the saddle-point equilibrium is presented in detail. Finally, we apply these theoretical results to a half-space guarding game in three-dimensional space. More realistically, since the whole achieved developments are analytical, they require a little memory without computational burden and allow for real-time updates, beyond the capacity of traditional Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs method. It is worth noting that this is the first time in the current work to consider the target guarding games for arbitrary high-dimensional space, and simultaneously in a fully analytical form.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ULTIPLAYER differential games have been studied extensively, and present important and interesting, but also challenging, problems in robotics, aircraft control, security, and other domains [1] - [6] . In these types of problems multiplayer reach-avoid differential games attract numerous attention recently [7] - [10] , as they can provide guarantees of safety and meantime goal satisfactions from the perspective of game theory. Originating from reachability analysis in hybrid systems, reach-avoid differential games consider the scenario of one or more defenders trying to maneuver and protect a predefined target by reaching a relatively small distance to one or more attackers, which strive to hit the target and meanwhile keep a safe distance from the defenders before the arrival. Differential games of this setup are also called target guarding games [11] .
Such differential games encompass a large number of realistic adversarial situations. For instance, in [12] multiple This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61374034 and 1210012.
R. Yan, Z. Shi, and Y. Zhong are with the Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China email: yr15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn and {szy, zys-dau}@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn defenders in a bounded planar domain are used to prevent multiple attackers from reaching a static target set by capturing the latter. The work by Garcia et al. [13] studied the dynamic game of an attacker pursuing a target aircraft protected by a defender which aims at intercepting the attacker before the latter reaches the target aircraft, and the associated state space dimension is six. A multi-agent collision avoidance problem was considered in [14] , in which each agent is steered from its initial position to a desired goal while avoiding collisions with obstacles and other agents. In [11] , the target guarding problem [15] was revisited to investigate the real-time implementation for the optimal solution. The linear quadratic game theory was employed to solve the problem of defending an asset in [16] . Motivated by football game, the authors [17] proposed a three-player differential game in a square region where two defenders attempt to capture an attacker before it reaches a specified edge of the game boundary, which involves six states.
As reach-avoid games, or called target guarding games, are prevalent in many engineering applications, a variety of methods have been proposed to deal with them, and have enjoyed great success in certain conditions. In general, the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability is a powerful tool, as it can compute the backward reachable set, defined as the set of states from which a system is guaranteed to have a control strategy to reach a target set of states, regardless of disturbances and antagonistic controls. However, the computation of this method relies on gridding, and hence suffers from the wellknown curse of dimensionality. Actually, the standard HJ method can only efficiently handle with the systems of up to five states [18] . Attempts to circumvent this problem, via symmetry of the considered systems [19] , linear programming [20] , system decomposition [21] , and boundary analysis [22] , have been applied to systems with special structures, but not scalable to larger problems and still subjected to the inherent inaccuracy.
For special problem setups and system dynamics, geometric control reveals a huge capacity of providing strategies for the players. For example, Voronoi diagrams are employed to deal with group pursuit of one or more evaders, such as minimizing the area of generalized Voronoi partition of the evader [23] , [24] , or pursuing the evader in a relay way [25] . Specifically, Apollonius circle is introduced to analyze the capture of highspeed evaders [26] , with a better performance than Voronoibased approaches. For more complex game domains, such as in the presence of obstacles, Euclidean shortest path is employed to construct the dominance region for each player [27] . More recently, paths of defense have been designed to approximate the reach-avoid set in [12] .
With advances in computation speed, model-predictive control and reinforcement learning methods have also been used. As discussed in [28] , a supervisory controller based on modelpredictive control was designed and tested in the switched and symmetric pursuit evasion games. In [29] , a feedback, receding horizon control law was proposed for the defenders to guard a harbor. Raslan et al. [30] combined a fuzzy logic controller with reinforcement learning to train an invader for the guarding a territory game. The interesting work by Royo et al. [31] presented an approximate dynamic programming algorithm based on recursive regression with neural networks, to approximate the value function of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equation (HJI PDE).
The subspace guarding game addressed in this paper involves two defenders and one attacker moving in the game space R n (n ≥ 2), implying that each player has n states. The game space R n is divided into two subspaces by a hyperplane. The attacker initially lying in one of two subspaces, attempts to enter into the other subspace by penetrating the splitting hyperplane, while two faster defenders aim at protecting the latter subspace and strive to prevent the attacker by capturing it. Actually, from another side, this game can also be viewed as an evader (the attacker) tries to escape from a subspace through its boundary which is a hyperplane, while avoiding adversaries and moving obstacles formulated as a defense team, especially, two opponents are considered. Our first goal is to answer the question that given any initial configurations, which team, under optimal play, will win the game. Then, as the game evolves, according to the prior game results obtained before, the optimal strategy for each player will be investigated by assigning critical payoff functions. To the authors' knowledge, this is a first attempt to address target guarding games in high-dimensional space. Besides, current works involving differential games focus on no more than three dimensional game space [32] - [35] .
Although the problem considered in this paper is different from the classical pursuit-evasion games that have been thoroughly studied, we borrow several existing notions and modify their definitions slightly to address our current scenario. Traditionally, the core for reach-avoid games is to compute the boundary of the reach-avoid set, also called barrier [15] , by which the whole state space is split into two disjoint subspaces: defender winning subspace (DWS) and attacker winning subspace (AWS). The DWS is the set of initial states, from which the defenders are capable of guaranteeing the attacker's capture before it reaches the target subspace. The set of initial states which lead to the attacker's successful entry into the target subspace without being captured, is the AWS. Since the barrier plays a crucial role in determining the game winner ahead of time, several methods have been proposed to construct it, such as HJI method, geometrical arguments and numerical approximation [36] - [43] .
This paper presents an analytical study and provides a complete solution to the considered subspace guarding game. The main contributions are as follows. First, for the game of kind [15] , an attack subspace (AS) method is proposed to construct the barrier analytically, and this is the first time in the existing literature to construct the barrier directly for arbitrar- Fig. 1 . Subspace guarding game with two defenders and one attacker in three-dimensional space (n = 3), where T = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 = 0}, Ωtar = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 ≤ 0} and Ω play = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 > 0}.
ily high-dimensional space. Moreover, since the constructed barrier is represented in closed form, the high computational complexity or inaccuracy arising in other methods introduced above, are overcome. Thus, this method is applicable for realtime implementation. Second, the solutions of two games of degree [15] are provided. In view of the guaranteed winning for one team, practical and meaningful payoff functions are designed, and the optimal strategy for each player, which essentially is a saddle-point equilibrium, is elaborated and referred as a command to an optimal point which is exactly located. The work [17] is most similar to this work in its approach, and it considers a two-dimensional case. However, our current work not only constructs the barrier analytically for guarding a subspace of arbitrary dimension, but also presents all optimal strategies in an analytical form, while the work [17] failed to present all optimal strategies in closed form.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the game, and state our assumptions, notations and problems. Section III performs efficient simplification. In Section IV-A, several important concepts are introduced and some properties are presented. In Sections IV-B and IV-C, the expressions of the barrier and winning subspaces are derived, including one defender and two defender scenarios. In Section V, two games of degree are investigated in two winning subspaces, and the corresponding saddle-point equilibrium is discussed in detail. In Section VI, a three-dimensional example is provided to highlight the theoretical developments. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
For the ease of the reader, partial important notations are provided in Table 1 as an aid to understand the paper, which will be also explained in more details later. A summarized description is provided with each symbol listed.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A differential game of guarding a subspace in highdimensional space is considered. The game is played in R n (n ∈ N, n ≥ 2, R n = R n×1 ), in which a hyperplane T splits the game space R n into two disjoint subspaces Ω tar and Ω play , and their expressions are given as follows: 
A,n P A 's initial position and its n-th entry x 0
P D i 's initial position and its n-th entry x 0 A,−n ∈ R n−1 P A 's initial position without its n-th entry x 0 D i ,−n ∈ R n−1 P D i 's initial position without its n-th entry
The attack subspace (AS) determined by
The AS determined by one attacker one attacker and one defender and two defenders
The barrier determined by one defender
The barrier determined by two defenders
Three disjoint parts linked into B 2x0
The initial position of
The attacker winning subspace (AWS)
The defender winning subspace (DWS) determined by one defender determined by one defender
The AWS determined by two defenders
The DWS determined by two defenders
Two fixed target subspaces (FTSs)
The unfixed target subspace (UTS)
Two strategy change surfaces (SCSs)
Three subspaces of T classified by the condition that which defender can reach first where K ∈ R n and b ∈ R are the known parameters, and K is a nonzero vector. Note that T ⊂ Ω tar . Two defenders P D1 , P D2 and one attacker P A , assumed to be three mass points in R n , can move freely with simple motion, namely, they are able to change the directions of their motion at each instant of time. The attacker P A is considered to have been captured as soon as his Euclidean distance from the closer defender becomes equal to zero. The attacker, starting from Ω play , aims at reaching Ω tar without being captured, while two defenders, initially distributed in any positions of the game space, cooperate to guard Ω tar by capturing P A . Thus, these two subspaces Ω tar and Ω play shall be called target subspace and play subspace respectively. We call T as target hyperplane (TH). If n = 3, the game components are shown in Fig. 1 .
The game terminates when the attacker reaches the target subspace Ω tar before captured, or two defenders capture the attacker in Ω play . If the former happens, the attacker wins, and if the latter happens, two defenders win.
Define the unit control set U = {u ∈ R n | u 2 = 1}, where · 2 stands for the Euclidean norm in R n . Denote the positions, or called states, of P Di and P A at time t in
T respectively, where T stands for the transposition. The kinematic equations of three players for t ≥ 0 have the forṁ
Here,
T is the initial position of P A , and the control inputs at time t for P Di and P A are their respective instantaneous unit headings d i (t) ∈ U and a(t) ∈ U. The positive parameters v D and v A are the speeds of P Di and P A respectively. Thus, the whole state space is R 3n . Unless for clarity, for simplicity, t will be omitted hereinafter.
Note that two defenders are homogeneous, as they have the same speed v D . Let U 2 = U × U denote the joint control set of two defenders, and since all possible cooperations between them are considered, the controls d 1 and d 2 will be selected simultaneously.
T ∈ U 2 denote the control of the defense team which can be regarded as a single player with two inputs.
A. Information Structure, Strategy and Payoffs
As is the usual convention in the theory of differential games, the equilibrium outcomes crucially depend on the information structures that three players may adopt when making their decisions. Specially for this game, we focus on a non-anticipative information structure, as commonly adopted in the differential game literature (see for example, [7] , [44] ). Under this information structure, two defenders are allowed to make decisions about their current inputs with all the information of the speeds and current positions of all players, plus the attacker's current input. While the attacker is at a slight disadvantage under this information structure, at a minimum he has access to sufficient information to use the speeds and current positions of all players, because the defenders must declare their strategies before the attacker chooses a specific input and thus the attacker can determine the response of the defenders to any input signal. Hence, the target guarding games or called reach-avoid games formulated here are an instantiation of the Stackelberg game [4] . The strategy for each player is to select a control input from the unit control set U according to its information about the system. As described before, determining which team will win the game gives rise to a game of kind [15] , which provides two outcomes of the game depending on whether or not one of two teams can achieve its objective. In practice, with the prior game results extracted out from the game of kind, it is a natural instinct to investigate the optimal strategies for the players in their winning subspaces by designing some critical payoff functions. Thus, two games of degree [15] will be investigated, as there are two winning subspaces.
If the initial state occurs in the part of state space R 3n where two defenders can guarantee their winning, assume that two defenders want to capture the attacker at a point with the maximum distance to Ω tar , while the attacker tries to minimize its final distance to Ω tar although the capture cannot be avoided. Thus, this payoff function, also called attackertarget terminal distance, is given as follows:
where t 1 is the time when P A is captured. If the initial state lies in the part of state space R 3n where the solution of the game of kind indicates that, under optimal plays, the attacker will reach Ω tar without being captured by two defenders, the following payoff function is proposed:
where t 2 is the attacker's first arrival time into Ω tar . This payoff function (4), also called defender-attacker terminal distance or safe distance on arrival, can be interpreted that: The attacker strives to maximize its distance from the closer defender when arriving at T , while two defenders seek the opposite. Moreover, this payoff function also indicates that the attacker wants to reach T under the safest condition.
B. Assumptions and Notations
We summarize here the assumptions we shall need throughout the paper. The first ones are concerned with the initial configurations of three players.
The explanations for these two assumptions are as follows. Assumption 1 states that all players start the game from different initial positions and P A is not captured by two defenders initially. Since the point-capture case is considered, we set l = 0. Note that Assumption 2 confines x 0 A in Ω play , which comes from our game setup. An initial deployment is admissible if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Define α = v A /v D to be the speed ratio between P A and P Di . We focus on faster defenders in this paper.
Let e i ∈ R n denote the vector of its ith element equal to 1 and the others equal to 0, I n denote the identity matrix of size n, and 0 m×n denote the m × n zero matrix. For any z ∈ R n , denote the remaining part when its ith element is removed by z −i ∈ R n−1 . For example, x 0 Di,−n ∈ R n−1 denotes the remaining part of x 0 Di when its n-th element x 0 Di,n is removed. For clarity, introduce several critical notations related to the initial positions of two defenders. Define
, m ij ∈ R and w ij ∈ R. Also note that B ij = B ji and C ij = C ji .
Define the following two matrixes, which will be used for characterizing the barrier and winning subspaces,
where the involved parameters are given as follows:
It can be easily seen that ζ ij,1 and ζ ij,4 are scalar, ζ ij,2 ∈ R (n−1)×(n−1) and ζ ij,3 ∈ R n−1 . Additionally, notice that Ξ i and Ξ ij are two (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrixes. It can be verified that Ξ ij = Ξ ji .
Let N 1 , N 12 and N 2 denote three subspaces of TH T , each position of which P D1 can reach with less, the same and more minimal time with respect to P D2 , respectively. Thus, they can be mathematically formulated as follows:
which will play a crucial role in our following analysis.
Next, define two notations associated with the relative initial position of P A with respect to the defender P Di as follows:
whose geometric meanings will be stated in Section IV-A. Note that θ i ∈ R n and δ i ∈ R. Finally, introduce several notations to simplify the expressions of optimal strategies obtained later. Define
The reasons why (9) is used will be explained in Section V.
C. Problems
For this subspace guarding game in high-dimensional space, three problems will be addressed.
Problem 1 (Game of kind). Given K, b, and any admissible initial configuration
, which team can guarantee its own winning? Does this subspace guarding game end up with a successful capture or a successful attack when both team adopt their optimal strategies?
Problem 2 (Game of degree). If the defense team can guarantee the capture in Ω play , two defenders or the attacker needs to find a proper control input based on their or its accessible information, such that the maximum or minimum of the payoff function (3) is achieved. In other words, find a saddle-point equilibrium (d * , a * ) of the maxmin problem:
T is the corresponding value function. Problem 3 (Game of degree). If the attacker can guarantee its successful attack into Ω tar , analogously, two defenders or the attacker needs to find a proper control input based on their or its accessible information, such that the minimum or maximum of the payoff function (4) is achieved. That is, find a saddle-point equilibrium (d * , a * ) of the minmax problem:
is the associated value function.
III. EFFICIENT SIMPLIFICATION
In this section, we describe this game in a clearer way. The TH and two subspaces in (1) can be represented by
and the coordinate transformation can be achieved as follows:
where z new and z ori denote the respective coordinates in (12) and (1), and {K, K i , i = 1, · · · , n − 1} is a basis in R n . Optionally, the Schmidt's orthogonal method can be used to find such a basis by beginning with K. Thus, without loss of generality, we focus on (12) hereinafter.
Hence, (12) implies that the three subspaces N 1 , N 12 and N 2 defined in (7) can be rewritten in the new coordinate system as follows. For N 1 , we have
which also implies that
(15) Therefore, in the similar way, these three subspaces in the new coordinate system are given as follows:
To simplify the analysis further, Problem 1 can be reformulated as follows: By fixing two defenders' initial positions, we aim to find the subspace of Ω play where if the attacker initially lies, two defenders can guarantee the capture before the attacker reaches the TH T , which is the DWS, and find the subspace of Ω play allowing for a successful attacking strategy for the attacker, which is the AWS. The surface that separates these two subspaces is the barrier. Fixing two defenders' initial positions provides a clear illustration of the barrier and thus two wining subspaces as the functions of these initial positions.
Thus, let
Di , α) denote the barrier, DWS and AWS determined by P Di respectively, which implies that these variants only depend on P Di 's initial position and the speed ratio as is proved below.
For two defenders P D1 , P D2 and one attacker P A , let
, α) denote the associated barrier, DWS and AWS respectively.
If P Di satisfies x 0 Di ∈ Ω tar , we introduce a virtual defender P Di with initial positionx
Di,n . Thus, it can be easily observed that the virtual defender and its original defender are symmetric with respect to the TH T .
Next, an important property on the barrier construction will be stated, which is a key step to simplify the problems.
Lemma 1 (Mirror property). For
, which suffices to show the correctness of this Lemma by noting that the barrier B 2 is the separating surface between
Dj , α) can be derived. Thus, we finish the proof. Remark 1. Note that Lemma 1 shows that the virtual defender plays the same role with its original defender in barrier construction and thus in determining winning subspaces. Hence, for clarity, all proofs below involving the barrier construction will only focus on the discussion under the condition x 0 Di ∈ Ω play ∪ T (i = 1, 2), but these relevant results are stated and hold under Assumption 2. Restricting two defenders' initial positions in Ω play ∪ T is to provide a clear illustration and easy proof for the general case stated in Assumption 2.
IV. BARRIER AND WINNING SUBSPACES
This section focuses on Problem 1, namely, which team will win the game. Obviously, this is a game of kind, which provides a binary answer to the name of game winner.
Therefore, the primary goal of this section is to construct the barrier, present optimal controls of the players on the barrier, and subsequently determine their winning subspaces.
A. Preliminaries
We begin our analysis with some preliminary results. Let the set of points in the game space which P A can reach before the defender(s), regardless of the defender(s)' best effort, be called AS, and the surface which bounds AS is called the boundary of AS (BAS).
Denote the AS and BAS associated with P Di and
Di , α) respectively. Thus, according to the definitions, the AS and BAS can be given by
Di , α), a more intuitive formulation can be obtained:
where θ i and δ i are defined in (8) . Thus, it can be seen that
is the interior of a ball of radius δ i centered at θ i , which also explains the geometric meanings of δ i and θ i . Naturally, bas (17) can be simplified as follows:
If n = 2, it can be seen that bas
Di , α) is actually the Apollonius circle [26] , and
D2 , α) denote the AS and BAS determined by two defenders P D1 , P D2 and one attacker P A , respectively. Similarly, the AS is the set of points in R n that P A can reach before both two defenders, which is formally stated below:
According to the transformation in (18) , (20) can also be equivalently rewritten as
. Naturally, the boundary of (21) is bas
. Unless needed for clarity, to simplify notations, hereinafter, we drop the initial conditions and speed ratio occurring in the expressions defined before. It is worth emphasizing that the geometric meanings of
A and bas 2 will be frequently used. Next, we present three important lemmas, which are useful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2 (Matrix property). The square matrix C ij is positive semidefinite, and the three matrixes A ij , B ij and C ij satisfy
Proof: From Section II-B, it can be easily observed that C ij is symmetric. Take any x in R n−1 , we have
Thus, C ij is positive semidefinite. According to the definition, note that
Thus, A T ij C ij = 0 also holds. Furthermore, we have
By considering the definitions of A ij and B ij stated in Section II-B, it can be obtained that
Thus, we finish the proof.
In the statement of the uniqueness of the optimal strategies presented below, the following lemma is utilized.
Lemma 3 (Strictly decreasing function). For any three constant parameters
in the interval
Then, G(β) is strictly decreasing for β satisfying (28), and its value domain is (0, 1). Proof: For G(β), we have
where G 1 (β) is given by
If k 3 = 0, since k 1 + k 3 > 0, we have k 1 > 0, and (28) also guarantees β < 0. Then, it can be obtained that
Thus, G(β) is strictly decreasing for β satisfying (28) . For k 3 > 0, we have (28) is simplified to β < 0. Thus, it can be seen that
If k 2 < k 1 , then (28) is simplified to
< β < 0. Similarly, (33) holds. Thus, G(β) is strictly decreasing for β satisfying (28) .
If 
is adopted by two teams, and if the attacker can assure its arrival in Ω tar , namely, (4) is adopted by two teams. Then, the optimal headings of P D1 , P D2 and P A are constant and the optimal trajectories are straight lines.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that three players have simple motion and the payoff function J T in (3) or J d in (4) is of Meyer type.
B. One Defender Versus One Attacker
We first present the construction of barrier and winning subspaces for the case with one defender P Di and one attacker P A , which will provide key insights into the barrier construction for the two-defender scenario.
Suppose that P A initially lies at a position from which P A can reach T without being captured, and denote its optimal target point (OTP) in T by p * such that the payoff function J d in (4) involving only one defender P Di is maximized.
Note that the non-anticipative information structure implies that P Di knows P A 's current input. Thus, as (11) shows, since P Di aims to minimize J d in (4), the optimal strategy for P Di is to move towards the same target point, i.e., p * , in T as P A does. Hence, by combining with Lemma 4, in one defender case, the payoff function J d involving only one defender P Di , is equivalent to the following function defined on the TH T :
representing the distance between P Di and P A exactly when P A reaches a point p in T , as P Di and P A both move towards p with straight trajectories. Thus, if P Di and P A both adopt their optimal strategies as (11) describes, then p * must be an extreme point of F i (p), namely,
by noting that p, p * ∈ T implies that p n = p * n = 0. We can conclude that if p * is an OTP in T , it must satisfy (35) . Due to its highly frequent use, (35) is called the first-order necessary condition for an OTP, and for short, it is also called FNC.
Lemma 5 (
and when x 0 A ∈ B 1 , the OTP p * in T for P Di and P A is uniquely given by
Proof 
which reflects the fact that when P A initially lies at the barrier B 1 , P Di and P A will reach the OTP p * at the same time if their respective optimal strategies are adopted. In other words, if P A initially lies at the barrier B 1 , no player can win the game, that is, the capture and arrival occur at the same time. Thus, it follows from the FNC (35) and (38) that
Also notice that p * ∈ T implies that p * n = 0. Hence, when x 0 A ∈ B 1 , the OTP p * for P Di and P A is uniquely given by (37) , where θ i is defined in (8) .
Since p * n = 0, (38) can be simplified as
Then, substituting p * −n given by (39) into (40) leads to x 
where the matrix Ξ i is defined in (5). Note that Assumption 2 and (12) imply that x 0 A,n > 0 holds. Thus, the barrier B 1 is given by (36 (36) . Thus, the barrier and two winning subspaces are found, which finishes the proof.
C. Two Defenders Versus One Attacker
As will be shown below, B 2 has two types. The first one is only dependent on one of two defenders, and the second one is associated with both two defenders. The conditions to distinguish them are as follows. For clarity, the defender which contributes to the barrier, is called active defender. 
Let p be a point in T that P D1 can reach before P D2 , i.e., p ∈ N 1 . Thus, the attacker whose initial position lies at B 2 with p as its OTP, could be captured assuringly only by P D1 while beyond the capability of P D2 . Therefore, B 2 depends on P D1 . In the similar way, it can be obtained that B 2 also depends on P D2 . Thus, B 2 depends on both two defenders.
,n , it can be seen that two defenders are symmetric with respect to T , implying that for any point p in T , two defenders can reach with the same time. Thus, B 2 depends on both two defenders. Actually, the mirror property stated in Lemma 1 also reveals that two defenders symmetric with respect to T play the same role in barrier construction, as Remark 1 illustrates.
Conversely, assume that x 
meaning that P D1 can reach any position in T before P D2 , and this feature guarantees that the barrier B 2 is determined by P D1 alone, that is,
,n |, analogously, it can be concluded that the barrier B 2 is determined by P D2 alone, that is, B 2 = B 1 (x 0 D2 , α). Thus, the case (a) is proved.
According to the argument for case (a), the conclusion in case (b) is straightforward. Thus, the classification conditions are found.
Next, we construct the barrier and winning subspaces. As Lemma 6 states, the ones for one active defender case can be obtained directly from Section IV-B. Thus, our attention will be paid to the two active defender case where both two defenders make contributions to the construction of the barrier. 2 is given by
i , which consists of three parts as follows:
where the constraints for the first n − 1 dimensions of z are given by
The winning subspace W A are given by T . If p * lies in the subspace N 1 , then P D1 can reach p * before P D2 . Thus, in this case, the barrier only depends on P D1 , and according to Lemma 5, the barrier can be constructed by (36) with i = 1 as follows:
and it follows from (37) that the OTP p * for P D1 and P A is given by
Since p * ∈ N 1 , (16) and (49) lead to Note that N 12 is given by (16) , and thus define the associated Hamiltonian function
where λ ∈ R is the Lagrangian multiplier. Therefore, the OTP p * meets the optimality conditions of H 1 as follows:
Since p * n = 0, in what follows, we focus on p * −n . Note that x 0 A ∈ B 2 implies that P A reaches the OTP p * exactly when captured, so we have (38) with i = 1, and substituting it into (52a) yields (55) Thus, we obtain the OTP p * for three players when x 0 A ∈ B 2 3 . Next, the analytical description of B 2 3 will be investigated. According to the property of simultaneous arriving (38) for i = 1 and p * n = 0, we have
By (55) and (22), the two terms p * −n 2 2 and θ 
Furthermore, considering the expression of θ 1,−n in (8) and employing the property (22), we can obtain two equalities
(59) and
Therefore, by substituting these two equalities (59) and (60), the equation (58) can be equivalently rewritten as
(61) where ζ 12,i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is defined in (6) which only depends on two defenders' initial positions and the speed ratio. It is worth noting that in computing the term ζ 12,4 for (61), the following equality is used:
(62) In a compact form, (61) can also be rewritten as
where the matrix Ξ 12 is defined in (5). Therefore, (63) is the condition that x 0 A should satisfy when P A lies at B A,−n when p * ∈ N 12 . As (7) and (16) shows, N 12 is the complementary of the union space of N 1 and N 2 in T , and thus so is A 12 with respect to A 1 and A 2 in R n . Hence, B 2 3 is obtained analytically as (45) and (46) show. The construction of the barrier B 2 is finished. As (41) and (61) = 1, 2) , the OTP for P Di and P A is unique and given by (37) , and P Dj (j = i) can adopt any strategy in U.
T for three players is uniquely given by (55) which can be also rewritten as follows:
(64) which reflects the fact that two defenders play the equal role in capturing P A (i.e., determining the OTP p * ) in this condition.
V. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN WINNING SUBSPACES
In this section, Problems 2 and 3 will be investigated to provide optimal strategies for three players when their initial positions lie in two winning subspaces, which in essence, are two games of degree.
A. Competition in the DWS
Since two defenders can guarantee to capture P A in Ω play when the latter lies in the DWS W 2 D , J T in (3) is considered by two teams. Denote the capture point by p * ∈ R n , which is also the OTP for P A such that J T is minimized. Thus, J T can be rewritten as the distance between p * and T , namely
For convenience, define one map φ :
with x = y. According to the definition and geometric meaning of the BAS bas 2 described in Section IV-A, it can be stated that the OTP for P A lies on bas 2 , i.e., p * ∈ bas 2 . Then, it follows from Lemma 4 that the optimal strategy for P A is to travel towards p * directly. Since P A aims to minimize J T , the following lemma can be obtained directly. (3) is considered, then the capture point p * is the closest point to T on bas 2 , and the optimal strategy for P A is a * = φ(p * , x 0 A ). Next, how to locate the capture point p * , namely, the OTP, is discussed. We call the defender which captures the attacker under all players' optimal plays, as effective defender. 
where p * is the OTP and given by θ i − δ i e n .
b (Two effective defenders). Otherwise, both two defenders make contributions to (10) , and (d * , a * ) is uniquely given by
where the OTP p * has two cases: If m 12 = x 0 D1,n − x 0 D2,n = 0, without loss of generality, assume m 12 > 0, and then
and if m 12 = 0, then
Proof: Part a: As (19) shows, the BAS bas 1 determined by P Di and P A is a sphere of radius δ i centered at θ i as follows:
showing that the unique closest point to T on bas 1 , is θ i − δ i e n , where e n ∈ R n is the vector of its n-th element equal to 1 and the other elements equal to 0.
Assume that there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} such that
is the intersection set of two balls' interiors R A . Thus, it can be claimed that θ i − δ i e n is the unique closest point to T on bas 2 . It follows from Lemma 7 that the capture point p * , i.e., the OTP, for P A is
Dj , α), P A can reach θ i − δ i e n before P Dj . Thus, P Dj has no contribution to the capture of P A , implying that any strategy in U can be chosen for P Dj . It can be seen that P Di is the unique effective defender, and its unique OTP such that J T is maximized, is also θ i − δ i e n .
Part b:
, α) both hold, we can state that both two defenders have effect on (10) and the OTP p * must belong to the intersection space of bas
. Since the goal of P A is to minimize its final distance to T , it can be concluded that the OTP p * is the solution of the minimization problem
First, we prove that A 12 is a nonzero vector in this case. If A 12 is a zero vector, i.e., x 0 D1,−n = x 0 D2,−n , (8) implies that θ 1,−n = θ 2,−n . Thus, the vector θ 1 − θ 2 is perpendicular to T . Note that θ 1 and θ 2 are the centers of two spheres
given by (19) . Thus,
holds. Even if θ 1 − δ 1 e n = θ 2 − δ 2 e n , it can be taken as the limiting case of Part a. Thus, A 12 is a nonzero vector.
Next, we transform the problem (72) into a minimization problem with only one equality constraint. First, by (17) and (70), the two constraints in (72) can also be rewritten as
(73) and thus the difference for (73) yields 
and then for the BAS (70) with i = 1, we have
(76) where R 1 , R 2 and r 3 only depend on two defenders' initial positions and the speed ratio, and their expressions are stated in (9) . The introduction of these three parameters can greatly simplify our analysis below.
By (9), for any nonzero vector x ∈ R n−1 , we have
Therefore, R 1 is positive definite, implying that there exists a nonsingular matrix L ∈ R (n−1)×(n−1) such that R 1 = LL T . Definez −n = L T z −n , and thus z −n = L −Tz −n . Hence, it follows from (76) thatz −n satisfies the constraint
Note that R
1 R 2 −r 3 > 0 must hold, as (78) comes from the BAS (70) with i = 1. Thus, according to (75) and (78), the optimization problem (72) can be equivalently reformulated as the following problem which has only one equality constraint
Moreover, according to the transformation z −n = L −Tz −n and (75), ifp * −n is the solution of the problem (79), then the OTP p * which is the solution of (72), is given by
Next, we focus on the solution of the problem (79). The associated Hamiltonian function is
where λ ∈ R is the Lagrangian multiplier. Thus,p * −n satisfies the following optimality conditions
T from the left and employing the equality (82b), we can obtain
Note that m 12 and λ are both scalar, and L −1 A 12 is not a zero vector in this case. Thus it follows from (82a) that
holds for a constant k ∈ R. Substituting (83) into (82a) and combining (84) yield
and since L −1 A 12 is a nonzero vector, (85) leads to
Thus, according to (80), (84) and (86), it can be verified that the OTP p * is given by
Since m 12 > 0 and R
−1
1 is positive definite, the reason why the sign of k in (86) is positive, can be obtained by noting that p * n in (87) should take the minimal value.
Case 2: Next, we consider the case m 12 = 0. Then, the equality (74), which is the difference between two constraints in (72) (equivalent to (73)), becomes
Thus, two constraints for the problem (72) can be replaced by
The first constraint in (89) can also be rewritten as
Notice that the goal of the problem (72) is to seek the minimum of z n . Thus, it follows from (89) and (90) that the OTP p * for the problem (72) satisfies
and p * −n is the solution of the maximization problem max z−n∈R n−1 The Hamiltonian function for the problem (92) is
and p * −n satisfies the related optimality conditions as follows:
Then, multiplying (94a) by A T 12 from the left and employing the equality (94b), we can obtain
Substituting (95) into (94a) yields
Thus, according to (91) and (96), the OTP p * is obtained as (69) shows. Therefore, we finish the proof.
B. Competition in the AWS
If P A lies in the AWS W 2 A , the safe distance on arrival J d in (4) is taken as the payoff function by two teams. As shown later, the AWS is split into two kinds of subspaces: fixed target subspace (FTS), and unfixed target subspace (UTS). The FTS is the subspace that if the attacker initially lies in, then both two defenders work in (11) and all players' OTPs belong to a specific subspace, i.e., N 12 , while the UTS corresponds to the subspace if the attacker starts from, only one of two defenders takes effect in (11) and the players' OTPs do not lie in the specific subspace N 12 . The surface that separates FTS from UTS is called strategy change surface (SCS). Thus, in this section, our goal is to find these SCSs, and then investigate the optimal strategies, i.e., the OTPs, for the players. 
where the OTP p * is uniquely given by
The parameter β ∈ R is the unique solution of the quartic equation
in the interval (28) , where three related parameters k 1 , k 2 and k 3 are as follows: As stated in Section IV-B, in this case, the payoff function J d is equivalent to the function F i (p) in (34) , and the OTP p * in T such that J d is maximized, satisfies the FNC (35) . In the next, we demonstrate that the FNC (35) admits a unique solution, and then present a method to find this solution.
Since p * ∈ T , then p * n = 0. Thus, we focus on p * −n . Based on whether x 
with the same direction. Thus, p * −n satisfies p * −n = βx
and then combining (35) and (103) yields
Substituting (102) into (104) leads to
Di,−n 2 (105) Thus, we further obtain that β ∈ (−∞, 0].
Next, we simplify the FNC (35) . Substituting (102) into the FNC (35) yields a simpler FNC:
which can be further simplified as follows:
(107) Therefore, the FNC (35) can be rewritten as (107), that is, G(β) = α 2 with the parameters (100), where the function G(β) is defined in (27) .
Thus, by solving the equation G(β) = α 2 , the OTP p * −n can be obtained from (102) . Next, we demonstrate that the equation G(β) = α 2 admits a unique solution β. We first show that the parameters (100) meet the constraints stated in Lemma 3. Note that Assumption 2 and (12) Then, we verify that β lies in the interval (28) with the parameters (100).
Since α 2 ∈ (0, 1) and we have proved that β ∈ (−∞, 0], (107) shows that β = 0 and
(109) Thus, β belongs to the following interval
Additionally, Lemma 3 has shown that the value domain of G(β) in the interval (110), is (0, 1).
In conclusion, it follows from Lemma 3 that G(β) = α (43), the proof of Lemma 6 reveals that two defenders reach any point in T with the same time. Thus, this case can be degenerated into one active defender case, and three players' optimal strategies can be obtained by Theorem 3, where P D1 and P D2 take the same point as their OTPs.
Therefore, for two active defender scenario in the AWS, we only focus on the case when x (4) is considered, the AWS W 2 A is divided into three subspaces
by two SCSs G 1 and G 2 given as follows (i = j, i, j = 1, 2): 
The OTP p * is given by p * n = 0 and
where the parameter β ∈ R is the unique solution of the quartic equation G(β) = α 2 in the interval (28) , where the related parameters k 1 , k 2 and k 3 are as follows:
Proof: Since x 0 D1,−n = x 0 D2,−n , it can be easily verified that T 's three subspaces N 1 , N 12 and N 2 in (16) In the next, we reveal an important property that given P D1 's initial position and a point in N 1 , the initial positions of the attacker whose OTP is this point, form a straight line. Based on whether x 
holds for k = 2, · · · , n − 1, which leads to the equality
where ρ 1 ∈ R only depends on p * and x 0 D1 . Moreover, the FNC (35) can be rewritten as
(119) and substituting (118) into the right side of (119) yields
where ρ 2 ∈ R only depends on p * and x 0 D1 . According to β < 0 in the proof of Theorem 3, it can be asserted that given p * and x , it follows from Remark 2 that the corresponding OTP is the point y in G 1 .
Thus, according to the straight line property proved above, it can be obtained that for all points lying at the line segment with x and its OTP y as two endpoints, if P A starts from them, its OTP is the same, i.e., the point y. Thus, G 1 is an SCS, separating the subspace with the OTP in N 1 , denoted by R , it is natural that P D2 has no contribution to the capture and can take any strategy in U. As for P D1 and P A , according to Theorem 3, their OTP is unique and given by (97)-(100) with i = 1.
If p * ∈ N 2 , analogously, the UTS R 2 U 2 and the related optimal strategies can be obtained.
If p * ∈ N 12 , we have x 0 A ∈ R 2 F 1 . By following the proof of Theorem 1, the optimality conditions (52) can also be derived. Different from Theorem 1, the feature of simultaneous arriving (38) fails in this case, as P A will reach p * before both two defenders.
Similarly, multiplying (52a) by A T 12 from the left and using the equality (52b), we can obtain 
Thus, similar to the proof of Theorem 3 (from (101) to (107)), there exists a β ∈ (−∞, 0) such that (114) holds. Then, substituting (114) into (122) yields the simplified FNC G1 G2 Fig. 3 . Partition of the AWS W 2 A when the barrier B 2 is determined by both two defenders with α = 0.5, namely, two active defenders. The AWS W 2 A is divided by two strategy change surfaces (SCSs) G 1 (orange) and G 2 (yellow) into three subspaces: two unfixed target subspaces (UTSs) R 2 U 1 and R 2 U 2 , and one fixed target subspace (FTS) R 2 F 1 .
G(β) = α 2 with three parameters (115), which still applies to the case C 12 x 0 D1,−n = C 12 x 0 A,−n . Since α 2 ∈ (0, 1), it follows from G(β) = α 2 with parameters (115) that the interval (28) is satisfied. In (115), k 1 ≥ 0 is straightforward, and also note that since x 0 A,n > 0 and A 12 is a nonzero vector, thus k 2 > 0. It has been shown in Lemma 2 that C 12 is positive semidefinite, so we can obtain k 3 ≥ 0. Moreover, if k 1 + k 3 = 0, then k 1 = k 3 = 0, and thus by (27) , G(β) = α 2 yields the contradiction α = 0. Therefore,
Finally, by Lemma 3, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to G(β) = α 2 in the interval (28) with the parameters (115), are verified. Thus, we finish the proof.
VI. THREE-DIMENSIONAL ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
For a better illustration of the above achievements, a subspace (half-space) guarding game in three-dimensional space is presented in this section, as Fig. 1 shows.
Take n = 3, and the TH, target subspace and play subspace are given by T = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 = 0}, Ω tar = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 ≤ 0} and Ω play = {z ∈ R 3 |z 3 > 0} respectively, as Fig. 2 shows. The initial positions of two defenders P D1 and P D2 (blue circles) are x 0 D1 = (−1.5, 0, −1)
T and x 0 D2 = (1.5, 0, 1.5) T . Thus, P D1 's virtual defenderP D1 (red circle), symmetric with P D1 about the TH T , satisfiesx 0 D1 = (−1.5, 0, 1)
T . Take α = 0.5.
A. Barrier and winning subspaces
This part focuses on the qualitative result, namely, which team can guarantee to win the game.
It follows from the classification conditions (Lemma 6) that two defenders are both active defenders, implying that two defenders both contribute to the barrier B 2 . According to Theorem 1, we can directly obtain that the barrier B 2 consists of three parts: B 
VII. CONCLUSION
The differential game where two defenders guard a subspace from one attacker has been solved in analytical form, including the barrier construction and optimal strategy investigation for each player. The barrier for one defender and two defender cases were both constructed, as it was demonstrated that under certain initial configurations, the barrier depends on only one of two defenders. Thus, the conditions about initial configurations to determine whether the barrier depends on both two defenders or only one of them, were given. It was also shown that the defender which contributes to the barrier construction, does not necessarily work in the capture of the attacker.
The optimal strategies for three players in two winning subspaces DWS and AWS split by the barrier, have also been investigated. If the attacker initially lies in the DWS, the capture can be guaranteed, and the optimal strategy for each player is equivalent to finding the capture point which was given explicitly. If the attacker plays the game from the AWS, the successful attack can be assured, and it was shown that the AWS can be classified into several parts corresponding to strategies of different type, which was presented elaborately.
This subspace guarding game and its analysis lay the cornerstone for future and more challenging reach-avoid games with complex dynamics, or scenarios where multiple defenders and attackers may be present. There are few reach-avoid differential games whose state space dimension is more than nine, which have been solved in closed form.
